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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The present thesis is an outgrowth of my senior honors

thesis which

I

wrote as an undergraduate at the University

of Massachusetts back in 1983.

Both papers deal with the

same subject, but there are a great many differences between
them.

My senior honors thesis focused almost exclusively on

the views of David Hume.

Rene Descartes were made.

Some comparisons to the views of
In the present essay, equal

attention will be paid to the views of four of the greatest

western philosophers:

Rene Descartes, David Hume, John

Locke and Immanuel Kant.
My experience has been that whenever any of the great

philosophers are studied in isolation one becomes very
susceptible to their views, since they argue so well.
I

first read David Hume's Treatise on Human Nature

,

I

When
was

wholly convinced that we cannot be certain that our minds
are anything more than collections of perceptions.

It is

only after one has acquired a knowledge of the works of a
few philosophers that one can begin to see some of the

faults in the reasonings of these great thinkers.
This paper represents my own attempt to gain a larger

perspective on a philosophical problem that had intrigued me
since

I

first read Descartes' Meditations

.

The problem is

to determine what sort of knowledge we have of ourselves as

thinking beings.

Descartes was certain that he existed as
l

a

2

thinking being, and what is more, he thought he
could be
certain that, as a thinking being, he was an immaterial
spirit wedded to

a

corporeal substance, his body.

John Locke rejected Descartes' conclusion that
can know himself to be an immaterial spirit.

a

person

Locke thought

that we experience our own thinking, and so, we cannot doubt
that we think.

But, he said, as far as we know,

it may be

possible that the substance that thinks in us is replaced at
every moment by

a new

substance, but that our consciousness

remains unaffected since these substances can transfer the
same consciousness from one to another.

According to David Hume, we cannot even know that there
is an active

mind that thinks within us.

He thought that

all we can know of the mind is that it is a collection of

perceptions.

Faulty reasoning led Hume to this conclusion.

In my section on Hume

I

attempt to show exactly what the

faults in his reasoning are.
Immanuel Kant also thought that Hume's conclusion con-

cerning our knowledge of our minds was wrong.

According to

Kant, we can know there to be something within us that

thinks.

Unlike Locke, however, Kant did not think that we

know that this thinking thing resides in us by experience.

Kant thought that we learn of the existence of the thinking

mind within us by drawing inferences from experience.

By

considering what experience would be by itself, apart from
the activities of the thinking mind, and by considering how

3

much we actually know about our experience,
we can determine
how much our understanding contributes to our
experience.
Once we have determined that the understanding must
make

a

contribution to our knowledge of our experience in order
that we can know as much about that experience as we do,
we

must naturally conclude that, of course, this understanding,
or thinking part of the mind, must really exist.
In sum,

then, we can be certain that we think, but we

cannot be certain as to what sort of thing it is that thinks
in each of us.

The question remains open whether it is some

immaterial spirit, or if it is just a corporeal substance,
our brains.

If we suppose it is an immaterial spirit, we

cannot be certain that it is always the same spirit that
thinks within us, for, as far as we know, immaterial spirits

may be capable of transferring consciousnesses from one to
another.

If,

on the other hand, we suppose that it is a

brain that thinks within us, then we can be relatively

certain that it is always the same brain that thinks within
us,

barring, of course, the possibility of some

science-fiction-like experiment in which the same
consciousness can be transferred by radio waves, from one
brain to another.
Insofar as

I

succeed in putting the views of the four

philosophers mentioned above on the problem of what sort of
knowledge we have of ourselves as thinking beings, in
perspective, this paper will be helpful to beginning

4

students interested in studying the
works of these men.
it
will help them to see some of the faults
in the reasonings
of these great thinkers.
It will also help them to form
the
basis of an opinion of their own on this
problem.

CHAPTER II
RENE DESCARTES
Rene Descartes had been dissatisfied with the

philosophy of his time ever since he was

young man.

a

He

said that despite the fact that it had "been cultivated for

many centuries by the best minds that had ever lived... no
single thing is to be found in it which is not subject of

dispute ". 1

He noted that,

in philosophy,

learned men will

apply all of their skill and ingenuity to make the views
they support seem probable.

The fact that a view seems

probable, then, may be no more a sign of its truth than of
the skill employed in presenting it.

For such reasons,

Descartes said that he "esteemed as well-nigh false all that
only went as far as being probable".

2

He was greatly impressed with mathematics "because of

the certainty of its demonstrations and the evidence of its

reasoning".

3

In geometry,

for example, one begins with five

axioms, such as that any two points determine a line, and

deduce theorems in accordance with some rule of inference.

Descartes hoped to be able to apply

a

similar brand of

reasoning to philosophy.
The axioms of geometry, Descartes thought, are

self-evident.

They do not require proof.

4

One could say

that they are self-evident because no one can doubt that
they are true.

To apply geometrical reasoning to

philosophy, Descartes would first have to discover some
5

6

self evident principles to serve as his
axioms.

All the

rest of his principles he would derive
from these first

principles.

His complaint against philosophies of
previous

generations was that nothing of any certainty could be
found
in them.

Any principle in which he could not be completely

certain could not serve as an axiom for Descartes.
to be an axiom meant to be indubitable.

For him,

Descartes wanted

his first principles of philosophy to have the same epistem-

ological status as the axioms of geometry.

He wanted them

to be beyond doubt.

Descartes searched for his first principles by testing
each of his beliefs to see whether any of them could not be
doubted.

In the M editations he finds that he may even doubt

that he has

a

body.

"I

shall suppose", he said,

not that God who is supremely good and the
fountain of truth, but some evil genius not less
powerful than deceitful has employed his whole
energies in deceiving me.
I shall consider that
the heavens, the earth, colours, figures, sound,
and all other external things are nought but the
illusions and dreams of which this genius has
availed himself in order to lay traps for my
credulity; I shall consider myself as having no
hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood, nor any
senses, yet falsely believing myself to possess
all these things.

Even under this assumption, however, he could not doubt his
own existence.

he said,

"I

Even if "there is some deceiver or other",

exist also if he deceives me".

g

Having found

that he could not doubt that he exists, Descartes decided
that the proposition,

"I

am", would serve as a type of axiom

7

for his philosophical system.

Axioms serve as premises in the derivation of further
theorems.

Given that he exists, the first thing that

Descartes was concerned to show was what he must be.

in the

end, he concluded that he could only be a thinking

substance.

He had a variety of things to say as to what a

substance is.

substance and
is,

he said,

At one place he distinguished between a
a

created substance.

"a thing

which so exists that it needs no other

thing in order to exist".
hand,

The only substance, God,

^

Created substances, on the other

"need only the concurrence of God in order to exist ".

A complete substance is, he said,

"merely

a

8

substance

endowed with these forms or attributes which suffice to let
me recognize that it is a substance".

substances, he said,

only incomplete,

Q

Incomplete

"have no lack of completeness", and are

"insofar as they are referred to some other

substance, in unison with which they form a single

self-subsistent thing".

^

A hand, for example, may be

considered an incomplete substance since it is
in itself,

a

substance

and also contributes, along with other parts, to

the composition of the body of a person.

Descartes also distinguished between corporeal and
spiritual substances.

Substances are of either sort

depending upon what sort of principal attribute they have.
It is

"a

common notion", said Descartes,

"that nothing is

possessed of no attributes, properties, or qualities'.

It

8

follows that if one observes an attribute,
there must be

something to which the attribute belongs.

Descartes went on

to say that "although any one attribute is
sufficient to

give us a knowledge of substance, there is always one

principal property of substance which constitutes its nature
and essence, and on which all the others depend". 12

From

the observation of any one of its attributes, then, we can

know a thing to exist; but only by discovering the thing's

principal attribute can we come to know what it is.
The essence, or nature, of any substance depends upon
its principal attribute.

A substance cannot be of a parti-

cular nature if it does not have the attribute that is

unique to substances of that nature.

A substance cannot

remain the same sort of thing if its principal attribute is
taken away.

All of its other attributes may be changed

without changing the nature of the substance.
what

a

To discover

substance is essentially, then, one would need to

consider what attributes of the thing could not be changed

without changing what the thing itself is.
In the Meditations

.

Descartes considered what the

essence of a piece of wax might be.

13

He began by noting

that the piece of wax that he had in his hand had
smell, and emitted a sound when struck.

a

When he moved the

wax near a flame, none of these attributes remained.
us attentively consider this,

color, a

and", he said,

"Let

"abstracting

from all that does not belong to the wax, let us see what

9

remains

.

He concluded that only the attributes
of being

extended, flexible, and movable remained.

These attributes,

he thought, are merely modifications of the
attribute of

extension.

The principal attribute of the wax, according
to

Descartes, is extension.
The difference between corporeal and spiritual

substances is that they have different principal attributes.

Descartes said that "extension in length, breadth, and
depth, constitutes the nature of corporeal substance; and

thought constitutes the nature of thinking substance ". 16
he goes on to say,

As

"we cannot conceive figure but as an

extended thing; so imagination, feeling, and will, only
exist in a thinking thing". 16

Because Descartes thought that there are two different
kinds of substances, the corporeal and the spiritual, he was
a

dualist.

"Two substances are said to be really distinct",

said Descartes,

other

h. 1 ^

"when each of them can exist apart from the

He thought that corporeal and spiritual

substances could subsist independently of one another, and
that is why he thought they were distinct.

Descartes thought that the mind is more easily known
than the body.

He could doubt that the external world

exists, but he could not doubt his own existence.

As he

said,
if I persuade myself that there is an earth
because I touch or see it, by that very same fact,
and yet by a stronger reason, I should be per-

10

suaded that my thought exists; because it may
be
that I think I touch the earth even though there
is possibly no earth existing at all, but
it is
not possible that I who form this judgment and my
mind which judges thus, should be non-existent °
.

One might think that Descartes is an idealist since
he

believes it is possible that the external world does not
exist.

But he thought that, as a matter of fact, there are

two types of substances.

He believed that these two types

existed independently of one another.

One type of substance

could exist even if the other did not.

world with no spirits, or there could be

There could be
a

a

community of

spirits with no physical world for them to inhabit.

Because he believed that
U-tg-t

,

"

nothing belongs £o my essence

to the essence of the mind alone)

tlmt I am a thinking being "

.

beyond the fact

he concluded that the mind

and body are completely independent of one another.

He

denied that the fact that the mind is an incomplete
substance, insofar as it is only a part of the essence of
man,

implies that the mind must be dependent upon the body.

"For in my opinion", he said,

nothing without which a thing can still exist is
comprised in its essence, and although mind
belongs to the essence of man, to be united to a
human body is in„^he proper sense no part of the
essence of mind.

According to Descartes, the way in which we know the
objects of sense is proof of the existence of the mind.
he said,
of wax,

As

"all the reasons which contribute to the knowledge
or any other body whatever,

are yet better proofs of

11

the nature of the mind !". 21

As we noted, he found that he

could doubt the existence of the external world.

He could

not doubt that he had sensations, but he could doubt
that

external objects were the cause of his sensations.

Descartes considered three possible causes of his sensations.

He said,

although the ideas which I receive by the senses
do not depend on my will, I did not think that one
should for that reason conclude that they
proceeded from things different from myself, since
possibly some faculty might be discovered in
me
hithert0 unknown to me which produced
them

—

—

One possible cause of his sensations, then, would be his own

self

Descartes ruled out this possibility.

He supposed

that God could create whatever he, Descartes, could clearly
and distinctly conceive, exactly as he conceived it.

Proof

that two things could exist separately, he thought, was the

fact that he could clearly and distinctly conceive one

without the other.
that he was only

a

This led Descartes to the conclusion

thinking thing which, as such, could

exist separately from his body.

certain faculties.

As a thinking thing he had

His faculty of imagination, he thought,

could not be conceived as being distinct from
thing.

a

thinking

The images he imagined would not exist if there were

not something doing the imagining.

Likewise, the faculty by

which we observe objects changing position or shape would be
useless unless there were some objects going through change.

12

Hence, it cannot be, according to Descartes,
that

a

person

can be the cause of his own sensations.

This argument begs the question.

Why is it that the

objects that appear to be going through change cannot be

supplied by some unknown faculty of the mind?

Descartes

said that this cannot be so because the active faculty that

does supply the objects of sense "does not presuppose

thought". 23

What causes objects to be present to our

passive faculty of perception is something that would exist
even if thinking things did not exist, according to

Descartes.

But this is exactly what needs to be shown.

Descartes also argues that the fact that "ideas are
often produced in me without my contributing in any way to
the same, and often against my will",

shows that these ideas

cannot be produced solely by his own faculties.

But if we

can suppose there to be some unknown faculty of his that

causes his sensations we can also suppose that he has no
control over this faculty.

Descartes' arguments against

this first explanation of how his sensations are caused are

ineffective.

But he goes on to consider what must be the

cause of his sensations if the cause is not, as he supposes,
one of his own faculties.

According to Descartes, there are only two more
possible explanations.

Either his sensations were caused by

God, and there really is no external world, or else they

were caused by external objects.

He ruled out the former

13

possibility when he said,

"since God is no deceiver, it is

very manifest that He does not communicate to me these
ideas

immediately ". 25

External objects, then, must be the causes

of sensations.

What the cause of our sensations may be is, however,

unimportant as far as any proof of the existence of
thinking thing is concerned.

a

Whatever the cause of the

sensations, it is enough to show that the mind contributes

something to our knowledge of them in order to show that the

mind exists as an active, thinking thing.
cause, the existence of sensations is

a

Whatever their

matter of fact.

One

need only consider what sensations are by themselves, to

determine what contribution the mind makes to our knowledge
of them.

From the fact that we can know more about what we

perceive than we could ever receive from our unthinking
senses, we can infer that there must be a thinking mind.

Descartes makes similar observations while discussing
the piece of wax in the M editations

.

As we noted before,

Descartes' wax had a certain color, smell, and made

certain sound when struck.

9

fi

a

Also, as we noted, Descartes

concluded that only extension belongs to the wax
essentially.

All other aspects of the wax may be changed.

Suppose the attributes are changed, as by the heat from
Descartes'

fire.

How does one know that what results is

still a piece of wax?

Not by the senses, for every

sensation of the wax is different from before.

An act of

14

judgment is required.

One must know what sort of changes

wax is capable of, and be able to recognize
when any such
changes take place. The senses merely convey
information.
They cannot make judgments.
Consider the attributes that persist through change.
Extension, and its modes, flexibility and movability, are
not attributes of the wax that are apprehended through the
senses.

A sensation is something that occurs instan-

taneously, and is replaced just as quickly by
tion.

a

new sensa-

Through sensation we become acquainted with

particular quality of the wax, at
place.

a

a

particular time and

But by saying that the wax is flexible we make a

judgment as to how its appearance may change in the future.
Descartes believed that we have

wax is.
size,

a

conception of what

We cannot imagine all the possible combinations of

shape, and position that one piece of wax is capable

of assuming,

yet we know that these combinations are

Our conception of wax is what enables us to com-

possible.

prehend all these possibilities.

Descartes did not explain

what this concept is, but we may suppose that it is

a set of

principles that describe what conditions will cause what
changes in wax.

Part of our conception of wax, then, would

be our knowledge that heat causes it to expand.

When

a

change in the wax occurs we judge that it is the

same wax by referring to our conception of wax.

If it were

not for our ability to judge, and our ability to form

15

concepts, we could be unable to perceive
that objects

persist through change.

From the fact that we do perceive

persistence through change we can infer that we can judge
from concepts.
But, more than this,

from the fact that we perceive

persistence through change, we can infer that there is an
active, judging mind that does the perceiving.

conclusion one must hold that
as flexibility

— attributes

a

To deny this

knowledge of attributes such

that entail that the object in

question does persist through time

— can

be given through

sensation
.

As we mentioned before,

97

Descartes thought that he

knew his mind and body to be completely separate and

independent things just from the fact that he could conceive
of each without the other.

The reason he could conceive

each separately was that each has

tribute from the other.

a

different principal al-

The principal attribute of the mind

is thinking, while the principal attribute of the body is

extension.

As we also mentioned,

from the observation of

a

2 8

Descartes thought that

single attribute one can rightly

infer the existence of a substance to which that attribute

belongs.

Just as from the observation of

a

colored figure

one can infer the presence of a physical object, such as

a

piece of wax, so from an awareness that there is thinking

going on, one can infer that there is

doing the thinking.

a

As Descartes said,

spiritual substance

16

it

is certain that no

thought can exist apart from
thing that thinks; no activity, no accident can
be without a substance in which to exist. 9
a

CHAPTER III

JOHN LOCKE
John Locke asked us to suppose the mind to originally
be like a Dlank sheet of paper,

or like an empty cabinet

30
.

He thought that the mind comes to be full of ideas only

through experience.

Sensation and reflection are the only

sources of our ideas, according to him.

Ideas are derived

through sensation by the interaction of our senses with

external objects.

Locke said that reflection is similar to

sensation, and may be called "internal sense".

3

Ideas

derived through reflection have to do with the operations
and activities of the mind itself.

Locke said that an idea is "whatsoever is the Object of
the Understanding when a man thinks".

sensations.
think.

33

32

Our first ideas are

They awaken the mind and cause it to begin to

The first idea we derive from reflection is that of

perception.

3^

Locke mentioned the fact that people often do

not hear what is going on around them, not because they are
deaf, but only because they are too busy thinking about

other matters.

3 K

.

He said that "whatever impressions are

made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of
within, there is no Perception".

3^

One must pay attention

to one's sensations in order to perceive, and by realizing

that perceiving depends upon paying attention one can

recognize oneself as being

a

perceiving thing

one can

recognize that one has some control over what one perceives.
17

18

Ideas are the raw material of thought.

Thinking, to

Locke, is just a series of mental operations.
that

a

He thought

man's repertoire of such operations is limited.

As

he said,

Man's Power and its way of Operation ... [are muchwhat the same in the Material and Intellectual
World.
For the Materials in both being such as he
has no power over, either to make or destroy, all
that Man can do is either to unite them together,
or to set them by one another, or wholly separate
]

them.

'

By uniting ideas, complex ideas are formed.

When ideas are

set by one another, they can be compared, and through

comparison, relations between ideas can be discovered.

General ideas are formed by wholly separating, or
abstracting, one or more ideas from

particular object.

a

complex idea of

a

According to Locke, all of our ideas are

either simple ideas, or else they are either complex,
abstract, or expressive of relations.

Locke said that "We know by Experience, that we
O O

sometimes think".

That we know we are thinking is,

according to him, as apparent to us as that the sun is
shining.

Both are matters of experience.

It is no harder

to understand how an idea of an operation of the mind is

derived through reflection, than to understand how the idea
of light is derived through sensation.

As Locke said,

from without, when
The Mind receiving the Ideas
observes its
and
upon
itself,
it turns its view
takes from
has,
it
Ideas
those
about
own Actions
.

.

.

19

thence other I_dga_s which are as capable to be the
objects of its contemplation, as any of those it
received from foreign things. y
,

We use words, thought Locke,

in order to express to

others the ideas in our own minds.
ei il Dfliy Signification
I-dgji .s

in ths Mlad

f

st and for nothing

him that

oJL

As he said,

u_s_es

them " 40

.

"

Words in

but the

He thought that

the truth of any proposition consists in the agreement of

the ideas signified by the terms in the proposition 41

For

.

example, the statement,

because the idea of

a

idea of a black swan.

"This white swan is black",

is false

white swan does not agree with the
The agreement of ideas, which is the

basis of Locke's account of truth and falsity, is something
that a person determines for himself just by comparing the
ideas in his head.

Locke said that,

"he that hath not determined the Ideas

to the Words he uses, cannot make Propositions of them, of
42
whose Truth he can be certain".

It follows that if we

want to be certain of the truth of our propositions we must
first determine what ideas correspond to the words we use.

Locke said that "The far

g reatest

part of Words

43
make all Languages, are general Terms "

the outward signs of general ideas.

.

General terms are

Locke said that

Ideas become general, by separating from them the
circumstances of Time, and Place, and any other
Ideas that may deterin^ne them to this or that
particular Existence.
,

that

20

and he gives an example of how this is done.

An infant in a

nursery may notice that his nurse and his mother have
similar shapes, and have other qualities in common; and
by

abstracting the ideas of these shared qualities, he forms

a

general idea, of which he has not yet a name, but which we
know to be the idea of a human being 45
.

Afterwards, he will

classify beings as human according to whether or not they

conform to the abstract idea of

human being that he has

a

formed.

Locke said that "gygxy distil gt abstract idea
)

distinct Essence " 46

nominal essence.

,

is a

He distinguished between real and

The real essence of things is "the real

internal, but in Substances, unknown Constitution of things,

whereon their discoverable Qualities depend ". 47
essence of

a thing,

on the other hand,

The nominal

is some of its

discoverable qualities, which may agree with some abstract
idea that we have, and so allow us to give the thing

a

name.

Descartes thought that objects have principal attributes
4
which make them instances of their kind.

8

These

attributes, he thought, are essential to the objects.

Descartes thought the real essences of things can be known.
Locke said,
Let any one examine his own Thoughts, and he will
find, that as soon as he supposes or speaks of
Essential the consideration of some Species or
the complex Idea signified by some general name,
comes into his Mind: And 'tis in reference to
that, that this or that Quality is said to be
.

.

.

21

We do not distinguish substances into species,
said

Locke, according to their real essences,

he thought that

things must have internal constitutions which are
responsible for the production of the various properties we
observe
in the objects.

But this constitution is unknown to us.

If

we see two objects with similar properties, we infer that

their constitutions must be similar.

Once we have

classified objects into species according to their
observable qualities, we can suppose there to be some

similarity in their internal constitutions, and this is as
close as we can come to aknowledge of the real essence of
species.

It is only by the nominal essence of things that

we can distinguish them into species.

It is only

after-the-fact that we suppose the members of
share

a

a

a

species to

common, real essence.

Locke said that words stand for ideas only.

His claim

that we distinguish substances into species by reference to

their nominal essence is compatible with this view.

The

nominal essence of anything is just an abstract idea with
name annexed to it.

Abstract ideas are ideas of types of

things, but we also have ideas of particular things.

Locke

thought that our ieas of particular things are just

collections of simple ideas, along with

a

vague notion of

something to which those simple ideas belong, or in which
they inhere.

a

Whereas our ideas of types of things are
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abstract ideas, our ideas of particular things
are complex
ideas.

Whereas our ideas of types of things are independent

of time and place,

"and any other Ideas

,

that may determine

them to this or that particular Existence ", 50 our ideas
of

particular things contain exactly those ideas which

determine them to a particular existence, such as the ideas
of time and place.

Our complex ideas of particular things are prior to our
As we noted 51 Locke

abstract ieas of types of things.

,

thought that the mind can either unite, relate, or separate
its ideas.

The ideas that make up our complex idea of some

particular thing must first be united before an idea of what
sort of thing it is can be abstracted.

Locke said,

that our complex Ideas of Substances, besides all
these simple Ideas they are made up of, have
always the confused Idea of something to which
they belong, and in which they subsist. 1

This is because "we imagine", said Locke, that simple ideas,
"cannot subsist, sine re substante

support them".

.

without something to

Our idea of substance

m

general, said

Locke, is of that which produces and supports simple ideas.

According to Locke, we form "an obscure and relative"
idea of substance in general before we form our ideas of the

different types of substances.

54

He said that even though

we categorize an object into a species according to its

nominal essence, we often suppose that each object, once
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categorized into

a

particular species, shares

a

common,

unknown constitution with the other members
of that species.
Descartes thought there to be two different
substances
out of which particular existences are formed:
the

corporeal and the spiritual 55
.

He thought that the two

kinds of substances existed independently of one
another, so

that spiritual substances are immaterial.

Locke said that

it is impossible

for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas
without revelation, to discover, whether
Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of
Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and
think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so
disposed, a thinking immaterial substance, 6
.

or, as he said elsewhere,

"it is no harder to conceive how

Thinking should exist without Matter, than how Matter should
think".

57

The only difference that Locke saw between

corporeal and spiritual substance is that the simple ideas
that make up our complex idea of a spiritual substance are

derived from reflection.

The ideas of corporeal substances

are compposed of such simple ideas as extension, solidity,

and of such not-so-simple ideas as the idea we may have of
an object that it has the power to fly or to swim.

Our

ideas of spiritual substances, on the other hand, are made
up exclusively of ideas of the operations of the mind.

Locke thought that our "obscure and relative" idea of

substance in general is the same whether we are considering

corporeal or spiritual substances.

He used the phrase
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"particular sorts of substances" to refer to different
sorts
of objects,

such as foxes, apples, or minds.

Descartes'

claim that there are two sorts of substances may give rise
to some confusion when discussing Locke's view of spiritual

substance.

For Locke, spirits, or minds, are just another

of the many sorts of substances.

relative'

The same 'obscure and

idea of substance in general underlies our ideas

of spiritual and corporeal substances.

For Descartes,

substance in general was of two kinds, spiritual and
corporeal.

Locke said that

Whatever... be the secret and abstract Nature of
SJJLbsiance in general, all t he Ideas &£ have of
particular d istinct sorts oi Substances are
nothing but several Combinations of simple I deas
coexisting in such, though unknown, Cause of^their
Union, as makes the whole subsist of itself.
,

.

What Locke said here applies equally to spiritual as well as
corporeal substances.

Descartes thought that the mind was

59
more easily known than the body.

Locke thought that the

real essence of objects of either sort are equally unknown.
The abstract idea we form of spirit is what gives us
the opinion that spiritual substances are independent of

matter, according to Locke.

He said that

the Mind getting, only by reflecting on its own
Operations, those simple Ideas which it attributes
it hath, or can have no other Notion
to Sp ir its
of S pirit but by attributing all those Operations,
it finds in itself, to a 6 §ort of Being, without
Consideration of Matter
,

The fact that our abstract idea of spirit contains no ideas

that are also to be found in any of our ideas of the
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different sorts of corporeal substances,
does not prove to
Locke that spiritual and corporeal substances

are made up of

fundamentally different stuff.

He thought that it is only

according to the nominal essence of things that
we
distinguish them into species; and

a

nominal essence, he

thought, is just an abstract idea with
know, the real essence of spirit,

a

name.

For all we

its internal and unknown

constitution, may be formed out of the exact same stuff as
are the real essences of various material things.

Locke

said that,
We know certainly by Experience, that we sometimes
think, and thence draw this infallible
Consequence, That there is something in us, that
has a Power to think. 1

Descartes thought that we can know the thing that has
power to think to be an immaterial substance.
it to be a substance, he thought,
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We can know

because thinking is an

attribute, and no attributes can exist without
in which to inhere.

a

a

substance

We can know it to be immaterial, he

thought, because only thinking belongs to it essentially. 63

Locke thought that
Essence of the soul",

64

"

thinking is the Action

,

and not the

because the soul does not always

think, as when it is asleep.

He said that

the Operations of Agents will easily admit of
intention and remission; but the Essences of
things, are not conceived capable of any such

variation

.

6

If thinking were the essence of the mind, and the mind were

to fall asleep, and stop thinking,

then it would stop being

26

a

mind.

Locke thought that even though we are
justified in

supposing that there is something within us that has
to think

,

a

power

we do not know the secret nature, or real essence

of this thing.

Hence, we do not know that it is an

immaterial substance, any more than we know that it is

material one.

a

How little we know about the thinking

substance itself is shown, by Locke, when he comes to
discuss personal identity.

According to Locke,

a

man's personal identity is

determined by his consciousness.

He said that "without

consciousness, there is no Person ". 66

A person's

consciousness need not be continuous.

Indeed, it is not,

since he must sleep.

Any two ideas that belong to the same

consciousness, belong to the same person.

We may suppose

that, for ideas to belong to the same consciousness, they

need not be present to that consciousness at the same time,
but only that they must both be capable of being recalled at

will
Locke considered the question,

whether if the same Substance, which thinks, be
changed, it can be the same Person, or remaining
the same, it can be different Persons.
He noted that the first part of this question is of interest

only to those who suppose the substance that thinks to be
immaterial.

Those who think that what thinks in us is some

material object, such as the brain, would naturally say that
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the same person remains through a
change of substance, since
they would acknowledge that the body
constantly replaces the

substance out of which it is made.

Likewise, the second

part of the question concerns only those who
take the

substance that thinks to be immaterial, since those
who
consider it to be a material substance that thinks
within us
believe that this substance does not remain the same.

Locke answered affirmatively to both parts of the
question.

As to the first part, he said,

if the same consciousness.
can be transferr'd
from one thinking substance to another, it will be
possible, that two thinking Substances may make
but one Person.
For the same consciousness being
preserv'd, whether in the same or different
Substances, the personal identity is preserv'd 68
.

.

.

According to Locke, we do not know that the same
consciousness ever is transferred between thinking
substances; but we do not know that such transference cannot
be made either.

For all we know, the substance that thinkks

in us may be constantly replaced by a new substance each

minute, and yet our consciousness remains unaffected.

Locke's view that personal identity consists in
sameness, or continuity of consciousness supports his claim

that we cannot know the thing that thinks within us to be an

immaterial substance.
no farther than we have

He said that "We can have Knowledge
I

deas "

69
.

We know there to be some

active faculty within us that performs the mental operations
that we perceive, but we have only

a

relative idea of the

28

substance to which that faculty belongs.

if,

as Locke said

it is possible that the substance that
thinks within us can
be changed without any change in our
consciousness, then,

for all we know,

the thing that thinks within us may be

different at any given moment.

CHAPTER IV
DAVID HUME
David Hume considered experience to be our only source
of knowledge,

as did Locke.

made up of perceptions.

He thought that experience is

As he said,

"no beings are ever

present to the mind but perceptions ". 70

He felt that all

our perceptions could be classified as either impressions
or
ideas.

All of our simple ideas, said Hume, are derived

from, and exactly represent,

some impression. 7

"''

Because

this is so, it is impossible for us to have an idea of

something of which we have not first had the impression. 7 ^

Because our experience consists of nothing but perceptions,
Hume said that

"
'

tis impossible for us so much as to

conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different
from ideas and impressions".

After we have had a certain

impression, and derived a simple idea from it, our

imagination can take that idea and connect it to any of our
other ideas, and form whatever sort of combinations it
wishes.
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But, said Hume,

Let us chace our imagination to the heavens, or to
the utmost limits of the universe; we never really
advance a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive
any kind of existence, but those perceptions,
which have appear'd in that narrow commpass. This
is the universe of the imagination, ^gr have we
any idea but what is there produc'd.
Also,

following Locke, Hume held that all our

impressions derive from either sensation or reflection.
Stated in Hume's terms, we have two sorts of impressions,
29
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and they are our only sources of ideas.

The impressions of

sensation "are such as without any antecedent
perception
arise in the soul

".
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The impressions of reflection, on the

other hand, arise either immediately after an impression
of

sensation, or after some idea.

Said Hume,

Of the first kind are all the impressions of the
senses, and all bodily pains and pleasures: Of
the second are all the passions and other emotions

resembling them.

Hume's theory of knowledge is similar to one that Plato

discussed in the TJagastetus

.

Hume held that whatever

knowledge we have is based upon experience.
are,

so to speak,

Perceptions

the basic units of experience.

Hume said

that "The only existences, of which we are certain, are per-

ceptions". 1

8

One can imagine Hume saying, as Theaetetus is

portrayed as having said that
It seems to me that one who knows something is
perceiving the thing he knows, and, so far as I
can see at present, knowledge is nothing but
perception.

The view that knowing is the same as perceiving leads

naturally to

a

conclusion that was very important to Hume.

If to know is to perceive,

know.

then not to perceive is not to

If we do not have a perception of a thing,

not have knowledge of it either.

then we do

To know that a thing

exists is to have some knowledge of it.

Hence, we cannot

know that there are things that we do not perceive, if to
know is to perceive.
of our knowledge,

We can determine the scope and limits

then, just by determining what perceptions
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we have.

Locke considered words to be the outward
signs of the

ideas in

a

person's mind

80

Hume's view is similar, as he

.

considered the meaning of any term to be the idea or
ideas
that it conveys, or brings to mind.

Locke thought that if

we are not clear as to what ideas our terms signify we
will
have no way of knowing whether the statements we use those

terms in are true or false.

°‘L

Similarly, Hume thought that

if we use a term to which there is no corresponding idea,

then because we do not know the thing the term refers to,
that sort of term is meaningless to us.

As Hume said,

When we entertain... any suspicion that a
philosophical term is employed without any meaning
or idea... we need but enquire, from what
iippxgssipn is that su pposed idea derived ? And if
it be impossible to assign any, this will serve to
confirm our suspicion.

Analyzing terms by searching out the perceptions that
correspond to them is fundamental to Hume's philosophy, and
he performs this sort of analysis often.

Of special

interest to us is his analysis of our idea of mind.

The

mind was considered, by people like Descartes, to be

a

spiritual substance.

We will begin by looking at Hume's

analysis of substance in general.
After having argued that our idea of substance is not

derived from the impressions of sensation or reflection,
Hume concluded that,
We have... no idea of substance, distinct from
that of a collection of particular qualities, nor
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have we any other meaning when we either talk
or
reason concerning it. J

Locke thought that our ideas of particular substances
are
made up, not just of simple ideas of the qualities
of
objects, but they also contain an idea of something to
which
they belong, or in which they inhere 84
.

Hume acknowledged

the fact that the particular qualities, which form a

substance,

"are commonly refer 'd to an unknown something

.

in

which they are supposed to inhere ", 85 but he considered this
something to be

a

fiction.

The something in which we

suppose that perceived qualities inhere is entirely

different from any of our perceptions.

Hume said that

We have no perfect idea of any thing but of a
perception. A substance is entirely different
from a perception. We have, therefore, no idea of
b
a substance.
To this it should be added that, we have no idea of

a

substance as something that is different from perceptions.
Our only ideas of substances are, as Hume said, just

collections of perceptions.
The above conclusion applies equally to spiritual and

corporeal substances.

As we noted, Hume held that the "only

existences of which we are certain, are perceptions", but he
thought that the constancy and coherence of some of our

perceptions enables us to suppose that there are existences
independent of us, which are distinct from our momentary and
interrupted perceptions.

87

Despite the fact that we are

naturally led to believe in external objects, Hume thought
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that we cannot know that they exist.

As far as we know,

what we take to be physical objects are really only
collections of perceptions, and the perceptions are all in
our minds.

Hume also thought that so-called spiritual substances,
or minds,

are nothing but collections of perceptions.

We

should note that he took the terms "self" and "mind" to be

equivalent.

He said that "The idea of ourselves is always
OO

intimately present to us".

According to his view of the

meaning of terms, this idea that we have of ourselves is the
meaning of the term "self"

(or

"mind").

Hume performed his

analysis of this term by seeking out the impressions from

which our idea of ourselves is derived.

He said that

when I enter most intimately into what I call
myself I always stumble on some particular
perception or other... I never can catch myself at
any time without a perception, and neygr can
observe any thing but the perception.
,

Because he could not find anything in his idea of himself
except particular perceptions, Hume concluded that his self
is nothing but a collection of perceptions,

and his idea of

his self is nothing but an idea of one particular

collection.

He generalized his findings, and said

I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind,
that they are nothing but a bundle or collection
of different perceptions, which succeed each other
with an inconceivable rapidi^, and are in a
perpetual flux and movement.

According to Hume, we have no idea of "the thing that
thinks"

("res cogitans" in Descartes'

terms) within us.

To
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him,

the mind, although it may really be "a
thinking thing",

is only known by us to be a collection
of perceptions.

He

said that,
The mind is a kind of theatre, where several
perceptions successively make their appearance...
The Comparison of the theatre must not mislead
us.
They are the successive perceptions only, that
constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant
notion of the place, where these scenes are
1
represented.
.

.

Hume's analysis of "mind" seems inconsistent at first.
If the mind is,

as Hume claims,

just a bundle of percep-

tions, what is the "I" that enters into the self, and

stumbles over the various perceptions?

Hume's way of

speaking suggests that there is something that looks around
at all the perceptions, and concludes that the mind is just
a

collection of them.

If there is something that enters

into the self, and reviews the self's various perceptions,
then, of course,

it would be a mistake for that thing to

conclude that the mind is just

a

bundle of perceptions.

Suppose that Hume is right, that the mind is just

a

collection of perceptions, and that minds have absolutely no
idea of anything within them that has a power to think.

The

question is, how could a collection of perceptions, by
itself, have an awareness that it is just a collection of

perceptions?

92

Nelson Pike gave an answer to this question.

After

noting that only thinking things can be aware pi anything,
Pike said that "A series of conscious states cannot be
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of itself as a

series",^ and the reason

not a thinking thing.

is because it is

He went on to say,

series of conscious states might contain an
awareness which is
itself represented as a
series.
Analogy: A collection of pictures cannot
a picture which is of itself pictured as a
collection.
But a collection of pictures might
contain a picture which is of itself pictured as a
collection 3
a

.

Pike's suggestion resolves the apparent inconsistency
in Hume's analysis of

"mind".

Hume's view that the mind is

just a bundle of perceptions is consistent at least, but is
it correct?

If Hume is right,

then we have no knowledge of

the existence of something within us that thinks.

Pike notes another apparent inconsistency in Hume's

manner of speaking.

Pike said,

When we turn to Hume texts, we often find him
saying that the mind perceives, believes,
remembers, etc., things... [But] for Hume, the
mind does not do anything it includes things.
Statements containing mental verbs... are used by
Hume as conveniences manners of speech... [By
Humean analysis] statements mentioning the
activities of mind... [can be] replaced by
statements affirming only the presence of certain
mental substances (perceptions) within a certain
3
collection

—

—

.

For example, the statement,

into the statement,

"I

see a table",

can be analyzed

"The visual perception of a table is

occurring within a certain collection of perceptions."
Hume said that,
All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a
comparison and a discovery of those relations,
either constant or inconstant, which two or more
objects bear to each other.
,

96
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Comparing is an activity.

If Pike is right about Hume,

then

any statements mentioning the occurrence of comparisons

ought to be reducible to statements affirming the presence
of certain perceptions within a particular bundle of
percep-

tions

.

How are we to reduce the statement,

"I

have compared

these objects", to a statement about perceptions?
our previous example of the statement,

"I

Unlike

see a table", this

new statement is not so easily reducible because, although

we know that visual perceptions correspond to the activity
of seeing, we do not know what sort of perceptions

correspond to the activity of comparing.
Through comparison we discover how objects are similar
and how they are different.

statement,
a

as

"I

Perhaps we can reduce the

have compared these objects" only by means of

statement about what we have discovered by comparing, such
"I

have found them to be different".

Using Pike's

analogy, we can say that we have pictures of these objects

hanging in our galleries, and "finding objects to be

different" only means that there is another picture in the
gallery that is a picture of the first two pictures, and

underneath this third picture there is
"These objects are different".

I

a

caption that reads,

can think of no other way

in which the information derived from comparing can be

portrayed in terms of conscious states, or in terms of
pictures in a gallery.

37

In order for any collection of perceptions to
contain

an awareness of differences among objects, then,
there must
be something within the mind that can read the captions.

This can only be a thinking mind.

The statement,

"I

have

found these objects to be different", is not reducible to
talk about perceptions; and so, neither is the activity of

comparing.
thing.

Comparing entails the presence of

a

thinking

It is impossible to represent the information

derived through comparison in terms of sensory information,

which is all that any perception, no matter how complex, can
contain
Hume cannot consistently hold that the mind is just

a

collection of perceptions, and that the mind can compare.
One or the other of these views must go.

mind does not compare leads to absurdity.

To say that the

Hume, himself,

said
that time cannot make its appearance to the mind,
either alone, or attended with a steady unchangeable object, but is always discover'd by some_„
perceivable succession of changeable objects.

We discover time, then, by noticing differences in objects
from one moment to the next.

differences by comparing.

But we can only notice

If we did not compare, we would

not notice differences, and so, we would have no awareness
of time.

The fact that we are aware of time, then, shows

that we are capable of comparing.

Since we certainly do know that we compare, the only
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alternative is to admit that the mind is not just
collection of perceptions.
that can compare and think.

a

There is something within us
This is the only sensible

conclusion
Some people think that Hume reached this conclusion on
his own.

R.

P.

Wolff said that

Hume began the Treatise with the assumption that
empirical knowledge could be explained by
reference to the contents of the mind alone, and
then made the profound discovery that it was the
activity of the mind, rather than the nature of
its contents, which accounts for all the puzzling
features of empirical knowledge. q y

There are reasons for saying that this view of Hume is not

entirely accurate.

The view that the mind is something that

can be active is contradictory to Hume's view, stated in the

Treatise

,

that the mind is just a collection of perceptions.

It seems unlikely that Hume would have made the profound

discovery that the mind is more than just

a

collection of

perceptions, and not have bothered to rewrite his first

philosophical work before it was published.
He did,

in fact,

rewrite the Treatise some years later.

The result of this rewrite was the Enquiries

.

In the

Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding he omitted his
analysis of "mind", not because he thought the analysis was
wrong, but only because he wanted his new works to receive a

better reception than had the Treatise

.

In the Engu iri-g-S he

continues to hold the same view as to how to analyze
terms.

100

If he had elected to analyze the term "mind" in

39

the En ctiiiries it is beyond doubt that he would
have reached
the same conclusions he had in the Treatise

.

His method of

analysis had not changed from one book to the next.

CHAPTER V
IMMANUEL KANT
As we noted

,

John Locke and David

Huine

distinguished be-

tween ideas derived from sensation and ideas derived from
reflection.

Immanuel Kant made a similar distinction.

He

said that the mind has two faculties, sensibility and the
UlKte-E-g-LSAding

.

Knowledge, Kant held, arises only from the

interaction of these two parts of the mind. 101

According to Kant, our sensibility requires of the
objects of experience that they be spatiotemporally
continuous.

He believed that our perception of space and

time arises out of us a priori

experience.

.

and is not derived from

If the external objects that exist

independently of us were not spatiotemporally continuous,
then because we only perceive objects as being in space and
time, we would not be able to represent these objects to

ourselves, and so, we would not know them.

The objects that

do appear to us through our senses appear to be in space in

time.

Hence, we can conclude that the objects themselves

are spatiotemporally continuous.

The above argument is similar to the following.

A

piece of hot wax is of such a nature that only hard objects

will make an impression upon it.

If one sees the impression

of a seal upon some wax one can infer that the seal itself
is hard even without seeing it.

The hardness of the seal in

this argument is analogous to the spatiotemporal continuity

40
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of objects in the other argument.

Just as there would be no

impression on the wax if the seal were not hard, so there
could be no image of an object in the mind unless that

object were actually spatiotemporally continuous.

For Kant,

the mind is of such a nature that only spatiotemporally

continuous objects can make an impression upon it.
Kant said that "appearances can certainly be given in

intuition independently of functions of the understanding".

them.
a

102

We can perceive things without thinking about

Locke also took note of this point.

He observed that

person who has no defect in hearing might not hear what is

going on around him if he is too busy thinking about other
matters.
I
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I

may have a succession of perceptions, but if

do not attend to them, and investigate them in order to

discover their contents
them.

I

do not learn anything from any of

Each single perception that

appears.

If

I

I

have appears and dis-

did not investigate any of them,

no memory of them after they are gone.

I

can have

As Kant said,

If each representation were completely foreign to
every other, standing apart in isolation, no such
For
thing as knowledge would ever arise.
knowledge is [essentially] a whole in which
representations stand compared and connected.

It is the role of the understanding to compare and

connect our experiences.

The understanding, Kant held, has

certain concepts which enable it to engage in rule-directed
activities.

105

The concepts provide rules which the

understanding must follow.

As Kant said,

"a

concept is
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always, as regards its form, something universal
which

serves as a rule". 1(^

Since it is the understanding that

connects up and organizes our experience, this organization
must be done according to rules.
Kant wanted to show that without the concepts of the

understanding it would be impossible for us to know that we
have any experience whatsoever.

If we were presented with

different perceptions, and our minds did not apply their
concepts to the perceptions, then
These perceptions would not then belong to any
experience, consequently would then be without an
object, merely a blind play of representations,
less even than a dream 1
'

.

Suppose

I

have a succession of perceptions.

then at any given moment

ception.
If

I

I

If so,

have before me only one per-

That perception may contain

a

variety of things.

am in a greenhouse during the spring then each of my

perceptions will contain many different patches of vivid
color.

In order for me to learn anything from,

anything out of, any one of my perceptions

I

or to get

must be able to

display each of the various contents of that perception
before my mind's eye.
perception,

I

must be able to say of my

"There is a yellow patch, and

several red ones, etc.".

If

I

a

blue one,

were not able to do this,

then no one of my perceptions would have any meaning to me
at all.
If,

as

I

was displaying the contents of one of my

43

perceptions before my mind,
content was as soon as

I

forgot what the previous

moved on to consider another

I

content, then the whole business of displaying those

contents would be of no use to me.
remember what
not,

I

then it would be just as if

The fact that

perceptions tells me that
I

must be able to

find to be in my perceptions.

the first place.

that

I

I

I

If

could

I

never examined them in
do know the contents of my

I

must have run through them, and

must have remembered what

I

found to be their

contents
Kant makes the following point,
If we were not conscious that what we think is the

same as what we thought a moment before, all
reproduction in the series of representations
would be useless.
fi

To see this, suppose

that at one point

I

have a succession of perceptions, and

reproduce in my imagination one of the

I

perceptions that has just gone by.
what

I

If

I

were not aware that

have reproduced is the same as what has gone before,

then it would seem to me that what has been reproduced is

really only

a

part of my present perception.

I

could not

know it to have any relation to something that existed in
It would not appear to me to be a reproduction,

the past.

or a memory.

As

I

would not be aware that it is

would not be aware of what it was remembered for.
being so,

I

a

memory,
This

could not think to ns£ that memory, and so

would not use it.

I

I

would be unable to compare the present

I
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to the past.

would be unaware of time.

I

may be remembering some perception for the
purpose of
displaying the contents of that perception before
my mind.
I

But if

I

forget why

I

remembered that perception the image

will mean nothing to me.

But if

I

know why

remembered the

I

perception and display its contents before my mind, and then
forget what these contents are (forget which perception they

belong to, or simply forget that they belong to some

perception

forget, that is, that what they are are contents

of a perception)

,

then as these contents are displayed

before my mind, they will mean nothing to me.
If we could not know that we have certain mental images

just because we are remembering the contents of some past

perception, then we could never come to know what the

contents of any past perception were.

And since we can only

display the contents of a perception to ourselves only after
the perception has occurred,

it follows that we could never

learn the contents of any perception.
The fact is, however, that

I

am able to remember

things, and to know with certainty that what

I

have

presently remembered refers to something that actually

occurred to me in the past.
Because
a

I

can remember, my experience is more than just

succession of disconnected perceptions.

entire series of perceptions.

I

I

can remember an

can remember them in the

exact order in which they occurred, or

I

can switch the
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order around.

The order in which

depends upon the purpose

I

I

remember my perceptions

have in remembering them.

if

i

want to know how

I

got to a certain place

I

may remember my

perceptions in

a

regressive order so that

I

can retrace my

footsteps.

Also,

of my perceptions.

I

can be aware of the contents of each

All of this would be impossible if the

mind could only perceive, and not analyze its perceptions.
David Hume did not think that perceptions have to be

analyzed before their contents can be known.

He spoke often

about perceptions of tables, trees, billiard balls, and
other common objects.

He did not think about all the

knowledge, stored away in a person's mind, that must come
into play before that person can say of some visual image,
"That is the image of a table".

Hume thought that the sole

activity of the mind is to associate ideas.

Still, he did

not think that we could know for certain that there is

mind that associates ideas.

a

He thought that from the fact

that our ideas appear to be associated, we infer that there

must be some mind that associates them.

As he said,

the actions of the mind are... the same with those
We perceive only their constant
of matter.
conjunction; nor can we ever reason beyond it.

A major psychological principle of Hume's was that similar
ideas come to be associated by the mind, so that the

occurrence of one occasions the occurrence of the other.
This sort of association presupposes that the mind can

compare ideas and find them to be similar.

Comparing,
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investigating, and, in general, discovering what
the

contents of our perceptions are involves more
than barely
perceiving.

We know that the mind does more than just

perceive from the fact that we know more about our

perceptions than we could if all we did was perceive.

if we

know the mind associates ideas, we know that the
mind does

more than just perceive, and associate what it perceives,
since in order to associate ideas the mind must be able to

perform such operations as comparisons.
Kant distinguished between empirical apperception

irm£X s£H££, and £jLang£g n<3enta l apperception 111
.

apperception gives us

a

.

or

Empirical

view of the contents of our minds.

When Hume entered most intimately into what he called his
self, and stumbled over his various perceptions, he was

engaged in empirical apperception.

Locke said that we could

use the term "internal sense" to describe the notice that
the mind takes of its own operations.

Through empirical

apperception, or inner sense, we come to know the empirical
self.

As Kant said,

inner sense "represents to

consciousness even our own selves only as we appear to
ourselves, not as we are in ourselves".
"a

Hume's phrase,

bundle of perceptions", can be used accurately to

describe the empirical self.
"Apperception" can mean "self-consciousness", but it
can also mean,

experience".

"understanding experiences in terms of past
It is the understanding that makes
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apperception of this second sort possible.

The

understanding requires of all our perceptions that they fit
into one organized, unitary experience.

priori

.

This is required a

Kant said

I entitle tra nscendental all knowledge which is
occupied not so much with objects as with the mode
of our knowledge insofar as, this mode of knowledge
is to be possible a priori
.

Hence, transcendental apperception, or the a prior

requirement of an organized experience, is the ground, or
condition of the possibility of, empirical apperception.
The understanding goes about organizing its experiences
in accordance with certain categories,

has.

or concepts,

that it

Proof that the understanding operates in this way is

that empirical apperception, or our experience taken as

a

whole is organized upon certain principles.
That there is a part of the mind called the

understanding is obvious from the mere fact that we are
aware of our experiences at all.

As Kant noted, without

this part of the mind, experience would be,

"merely a blind

play of representations, less even than a dream".
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It is

the understanding that investigates our perceptions so that

their contents can become known to us.

It is the

understanding to which belong the faculties of memory and
imagination.

In answer to Hume,

mind is not just

a

how do we know that the

collection of perceptions?

Because

without an active thinking part of the mind to understand
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our perceptions experience, or bare consciousness, would
be

impossible
Kant's philosophy reaffirms that we can be certain that
there is a thinking aspect of the mind.

analysis of mind obsolete.

Kant made Hume's

Descartes thought we can be

certain that we exist as things that think, but he also
thought that we could know the thing that thinks within us
to be an immaterial spirit.

John Locke thought that we

could know ourselves to be thinking things, but that we can
not know ourselves to be substances of any sort.

Kant

agreed with Locke on this point.
I

have already discussed Kant's point that experience

would be impossible without
perceptions.

Now,

I

a

thinking mind to interpret our

would like to discuss his point that

self-knowledge would be impossible if the self did not have
any experiences.

Kant said that "'I think'... is an

empirical proposition...
inner sense".

[that]

cannot take place without

According to Kant, Descartes' belief that

we can know ourselves to be immaterial spirits rests on

faulty reasoning.

Kant said that

think myself on behalf of a possible experience,
at the same time abstracting from all actual
experience; and I conclude therefrom that I can be
conscious of my existence even apart from
In so
experience and its empirical conditions.
doing I am confusing the possible abstrac.tl-QJl from
my empirically determined existence with the
supposed consciousness of a possible gepaxa Le
existence of my thinking self, and I thus come to
believe that I have knowl_ed gg that what is su£- g
stantial in me is the transcendental subject.
I

_
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In fact,

the transcendental subject, or the understanding

considered by itself apart from any possible experience,
would be unconscious of everything, including itself.
Kant's insight into this matter is shown when we consider
that even those who believe the self to be an immaterial

spirit, and who believe in an after-life in which the self
is separated from this physical world,

still can only

imagine that after-life in terms of a possible experience.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION
I

hope that this survey of the views of these four

philosophers on the same philosophical problem puts such

a

perspective on this problem that renders it more
understandable.

Before

I

end this paper

I

would like to

discuss Locke's view that we cannot be certain that it is
always the same substance that thinks within us.
As far as Locke was concerned, continuity of

consciousness was the sole criterion of personal identity.
He considered whether the same person could remain even if

the substance that thinks inside him were replaced.

This

reduces to the question, can the same consciousness be

transferred from one thinking substance to another?

Locke

considered this question within the context of taking the
substance that thinks to be immaterial.

In this context,

the question is unanswerable since we do not know anything

about the nature of immaterial spirits.

But the same

problem can be raised even if we suppose that it is some
material thing, such as

a

brain, that thinks within us.

If

it is possible to transfer the same consciousness from one

brain to another, then, according to Locke, the same person

remains after the transfer as before.

Suppose

a

mad scientist devised a machine that could

transfer consciousness from one brain to another.

If

everyone knew about this machine, they would know that it is
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possible that it will not always be the same substance that
thinks within them, and so they will not count sameness of

substance as the criterion of personal identity.
A person whose consciousness was transferred to another

brain by this machine would know that his consciousness has
been transferred since he would find himself inhabiting

another body.

This fact distinguishes the case of transfer

of consciousness between brains from transfer of

consciousness between spirits.
if

For, as Locke pointed out,

it is a spirit that thinks within each of us,

then these

spirits could transfer consciousness from one to the other

without our even knowing it, since they could also transfer
from body to body.

Suppose that the consciousness-transfer exists, and
that the mad scientist transfers consciousness from one

brain to another, but that he also sedates his victims and

performs

a

brain transfer on them.

When the unsuspecting

victims awaken, they will find themselves within the same
bodies, and with the same consciousness as they had before
intact, but the substance that thinks within them will have

been changed.

And they will no£ £Y£n

Jsnnw i£.

This case is

identical to the transfer of consciousness between spirits
that Locke considered.
If,

on the other hand,

a

brain transfer were performed

without a consciousness transfer also taking place, the
victims would know that something fishy had happened to
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them

but, furthermore,

,

it would still be the same brain

that had the same consciousness within each of them.
If a person knew that consciousness transfers and brain

transfers were both possible, and he woke up in somebody
else

1

s

body, he could not be certain whether he had

undergone a brain transfer or
so,

a

consciousness transfer, and

he could not be certain whether it was still the same

substance that thinks within him.
We do not know that brain transfers and consciousness

transfers are impossible.

We do know, however, that no one

has yet devised a way to perform either feat.

Hence, those

of us who believe that it is a brain that thinks within each
of us can be satisfied that it is always the same substance

that thinks within each of us.

Since our brains are part of

our bodies there is no need for us to refrain from taking

sameness of body to be

a

criterion of personal identity.

Of

course, we cannot be absolutely certain that it is always
the same substance that thinks in us, since it is possible

that what thinks in us is an immaterial spirit.

We must be

satisfied in being practically certain that it is always the
same substance that thinks within us.
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